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CANONICAL TRUTH
MERLIN CARL AND PHILIPP SCHLICHT
Abstract. We introduce and study some variants of a notion of
canonical set theoretical truth, which means truth in a transitive
class model that is uniquely characterized by some ∈-formula.
1. Introduction
It is an old logical dream to devise an effectively describable ax-
iomatic system for mathematics that uniquely describes ‘mathematical
reality’; in modern logical language, this should mean at least that it
uniquely fixes a model. It is well-known that this dream is unattain-
able in first-order logic: By the Löwenheim-Skolem-theorem, we get
models of all infinite cardinalities once there is one infinite model; and
by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, if the theory is strong enough to
express elementary arithmetic, it will have different models that are
not even elementary equivalent.
Focusing on ZFC set theory, one of the main foundational frameworks
for mathematics, these two effects can in a certain sense be cancelled
out by asking not for arbitrary models, but for transitive models that
are proper class-sized, i.e. contain all ordinals. When we restrict the
allowed models in this way, there are extensions of ZFC that uniquely
fix a model. The most prominent example is V = L: It is well-known
(and provable in ZFC) that ZFC+V=L has exactly one transitive class-
model, provided that ZFC is consistent.
This form of canonicity gives the axiom of constructibility a certain
attractivity: It seems to describe, up to the unavoidable weakness of
first-order logic, a unique ‘mathematical reality’. However, it is usually
seen as too restrictive since many objects of set-theoretical interest are
ruled out under this assumption.
However, V = L is by far not the only theory that uniquely fixes a
transitive class model: Other example include V = L[0♯], or V = L[x],
where x is an absolute Π12-singleton (see below). The ‘true mathemat-
ical reality’ that the adherents of the logical dream mentioned in the
beginning believe in would have to be one of those ‘canonical’ models.
Hence, whatever holds in all of these ‘canonical’ models will have to be
believed by someone who believes in a uniquely describable mathemati-
cal reality. We call such statements ‘canonically necessary’. If there are
no such statements that go beyond what is derivable from ZFC, then
this kind of mathematical realism would be mathematically neutral:
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the belief in a uniquely describable mathematical reality would merely
be a way of interpreting set theory, without influencing it. On the other
hand, if there are statements that hold in all canonical models without
following from ZFC, this realistic mindset would be mathematically
informative.
In this paper, we investigate statements that hold in all ‘canonical’
models of ZFC, i.e. in all transitive class models that are uniquely fixed
by some extension of ZFC by finitely many extra statements. It turns
out that the realistic mindset is indeed mathematically informative:
Examples of canonically necessary statements that do not follow from
ZFC are the ground model axiom of ([R]) (Theorem 10) and the non-
existence of measurable cardinals (Theorem 11).
We conclude with various open questions; in particular, we do not
know whether there are canonical models of ZF+AD (i.e. whether there
are canonical models of the axiom of determinacy) or even whether
there are canonical models of ZF+¬AC (i.e. whether the axiom of
choice is canonically necessary over ZF).
2. Basics Definitions
We start by giving a formal counterpart to the intuitive idea that a
theory T ‘uniquely fixes a transitive class model’. This is not straight-
forward, as quantifying over proper classes is not possible in ZFC. This
might be solvable by instead working in NBG, but we prefer to stick
to ZFC for the moment, partly because the methods we intend to use
(forcing, class forcing and inner models) are commonly developed for
ZFC models. Thus, a proper class model of ZFC will always be an
inner model of V . Of course, this will immediately trivialize our anal-
ysis when one assumes V = L, so that L is the only transitive class
model. To get a sufficient supply of inner models, we will hence assume
sufficient large cardinals in our metatheory.
Still, we need to deal with our inability, due to the lack of a truth
predicate, to quantify over all inner models. This will be solved by
formulating the uniqueness not as a single statement, but as a scheme.
Still, we need to express that the class defined by a formula φ is a
model of ZFC. Again, this is not trivial, since ZFC is not finitely ax-
iomatizable. Fortunately, for the case we are interested in, there is a
workaround:
Lemma 1. [See [Je], Theorem 13.9.] A transitive class C is a model
of ZF if and only if C is closed under Gödel operations and almost
universal (i.e. for every subset x ⊆ C, there is y ∈ C with x ⊆ y).
We fix a natural enumeration (ψi : i ∈ ω) of the ∈-formulas in order
type ω.
CANONICAL TRUTH 3
Definition 2. Let φ be an ∈-formula, i, j ∈ ω. Let TMi(φ, y) (‘transi-
tive model’) abbreviate the statement ‘Mψi,y := {x : ψi(x, y)} is tran-
sitive, is almost universal, closed under Gödel operations, contains all
ordinals and satisfies ACMψi,y and φMψi,y ’.
The uniqueness statement Uφij is the following ∈-formula: ∀y, y
′[(TMi(φ, y)∧
TMj(φ, y
′)) → ∀x(ψi(x, y)↔ ψj(x, y
′))].
Now, φ is a uniqueness statement if and only if all elements of Uφ :=
{Uφij : i, j ∈ ω} are provable in ZFC
1.
Moreover, for T an extension of ZFC, φ is a T -canonical statement
if and only if there is some i ∈ ω such that T proves ∃yTMi(φ, y).
Remark: Typically, T will consist of ZFC together with appropriate
large cardinal assumptions.
Definition 3. Let T be an extension of ZFC.
IfM is a transitive class model of ZFC, thenM is T -canonical if and
only if there is a T -canonical statement φ such that M |= φ.
If A is any ∈-theory and φ is an ∈-statement, then φ canonically
follows from A if and only if φ holds in all canonical models in which
A holds.
Remark: In the last definition, we can drop the dependence of ZFC
and talk e.g. about canonical consequences of KP or ZF in the obvious
manner.
3. Examples of Canonical Truth
Obvious examples for uniqueness statements are V = L or V = L[0♯]
with corresponding canonical models L and L[0♯]. These actually give
rise to a larger class of examples:
Definition 4. A real number x is a relative Π12-singleton if and only if
there is a Π12-statement φ such that x is the unique element y of L[x]
with L[x] |= φ(y).
A real number x is an absolute Π12-singleton if and only if there is a
Π12-statement φ such that x is the unique element y of V with φ(y).
Corollary 5. An absolute Π12-singleton x is the unique element sat-
isfying its defining Π12-formula φ in each transitive inner model that
contains x, while all other models will not contain such a witness.
Proof. By Shoenfield absoluteness, if M is a transitive class model,
x ∈M and M |= φ(x), then V |= φ(x). Hence, if some transitive inner
model had two distinct elements satisfying φ, the same would hold
for V , contradicting uniqueness. Similarly, if M was some transitive
inner model with x /∈ M but M |= φ(y) for some y ∈ M , then V |=
φ(x) ∧ φ(y) ∧ x 6= y, again contradicting the uniqueness. 
1Alternatively, we could also demand that all elements of Uφ hold in V . We will
not follow this idea here.
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The existence of 0♯ has consistency strength. However, no such as-
sumption is needed to obtain canonical models beyond the constructible
universe:
Proposition 6. It is consistent relative to ZFC that there are canonical
models besides L.
Proof. (Sketch) Force a Π12-singleton over L as described in chapter 6
of [Fr], the generic extension satisfies that there is a real number r
satisfying the Π12-statement ψ (which is unique) and V = L[r] and is
unique with this property. 
Definition 7. A statement φ is canonically necessary (c.n.) if and
only if φ holds in all canonical models.
A statement φ is canonically possible (c.p.) if and only if there
is a canonical model M |= φ, i.e. if and only if its negation is not
canonically necessary.
Our first observation is that there are canonically necessary state-
ments that are not provable in ZFC:
Lemma 8. There is some ∈-formula φ such that φ does not hold in all
transitive class models of ZFC, but φ is canonically necessary.
Proof. Let φ be the statement: ‘It is not the case that there is a Cohen-
generic filter G over L such that V = L[G]’. (Thus, intuitively, φ says:
‘I am not a Cohen-extension of L’). This is an ∈-statement. Clearly,
φ is false in a Cohen-extension L[G] of L.
On the other hand, let M be canonical and assume that M |= φ.
Let ψ be a uniqueness statement for M . Then there is some G Cohen-
generic over L with M = L[G]. Moreover, as M |= ψ, there is some
condition p such that p  ψ. Let G′ be Cohen-generic over L relative to
G such that p ∈ G′. Then L[G′] |= ψ but L[G′] 6= L[G], a contradiction
to the assumption that ψ is a uniqueness statement. 
This example can be considerably strengthened: In fact, no set forc-
ing extension can be canonical. It is not clear that the statement ‘I am
not a set forcing extension’ is expressable in the first-order language
of set theory at all, but by [R], where it is introduced under the name
‘ground model axiom’ or ‘ground axiom’, it turns out to be so.
Definition 9 (See [R]). The Ground Model Axiom (GMA) is the state-
ment that there is no transitive class model M of ZFC such that, for
some forcing P ∈ M and some P-generic filter G over M , we have
V = M [G]. It is proved in [R] that GMA is expressible as an ∈-formula.
Theorem 10. The ground model axiom GMA is canonical necessary.
Proof. Assume that M is canonical, witnessed by φ, and M does not
satisfy the ground axiom, e.g. M = N [G], where N is an inner model
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of M and G is a generic filter for a forcing P ∈ N . As φ holds in M ,
there is some p ∈ P such that p  φ over N .
We pass from M to a generic extension M [H ] in which PM (P) is
countable (via some Levy collapse). (The generic filter H need not
exist, but the argument here still suffices for showing that ZFC can’t
prove that there is a unique transitive class model of ZFC+φ.) In
M [H ], everything we care about is sufficiently countable so that we find
two mutually P-generic filters containing p, namely G1, G2 over M , a
fortiori over N . Hence N [G1] |= φ and N [G2] |= φ, but N [G1] 6= N [G2],
as e.g. G1 ∈ N [G1] \N [G2], so M = N [G] cannote be unique with this
property, a contradiction.

Given this, one might wonder whether GMA captures the full strength
of canonical necessity, i.e. whether there are canonically necessary
statements that do not follow from GMA. This also turns out to be
true:
Theorem 11. The statement that ‘There is no measurable cardinal’
is canonically necessary.
Proof. Assume otherwise, and let M be a canonical model with a mea-
surable cardinal κ and a normal ultrafilter U on κ. Furthermore, let
φ be a statement that witnesses the canonicity of M . Then Ult(M,U)
is a transitive class (it is clearly definable in V from U and the pa-
rameters used for defining M in V ) that is elementary equivalent to
M , hence in particular satisfies ZFC+φ and is different from M , a
contradiction. 
Remark: By the same reasoning, no ultrapower can be a canonical
model. This, however, does not lead to another c.n. statement, as ‘I
am no ultrapower’ is not first-order expressable. (If it was, then so was
‘I am no ultrapower’, but the truth value of this statement would have
to change when passing e.g. from L to Ult(L, U).)
Corollary 12. There are c.n. statements that do not follow from
GMA.
Proof. By results of J. Reitz (see [R]), the finestructural models for
measurable cardinals satisfy GMA. Hence, the nonexistence of measur-
able cardinals does not follow from GMA. 
The canonical impossibility of measurable cardinals suggests further
considerations about the canonical possiblity, or otherwise, of large
cardinals. First, a positive observation:
Theorem 13. (i) Let φ♯ be the statement ‘For every x ⊆ ω, x♯ exists’.
If φ♯ holds in V , then φ♯ is canonically possible.
(ii) If φ† is the statement that x† exists for every x ⊆ ω, and φ† holds
in V , then φ† is canonically possible.
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Proof. (i) Let us add the unary function symbol ♯ to the language of set
theory, with the obvious intended meaning. For a set X, let Def♯(X)
be the set of subsets of X that are definable over X using the language
of set theory extended by ♯. Now define a class Lˆ ⊆ V in analogy with
L as follows:
• Lˆ0 = ∅
• Lˆα+1 = Def
♯(Lˆα)
• Lˆλ =
⋃
ι<λ Lˆι for ι < λ
• Finally, Lˆ :=
⋃
ι∈On Lˆι.
By Π12-absoluteness of sharps, the sharp function and thus Lˆ is a
definable subclass of V via the recursion just stated. It is clear from
the definition that Lˆ |= φ♯. That Lˆ |= ZFC can be checked similarly to
the fact that ZFC holds in L. Thus Lˆ is a canonical model in which φ♯
holds.
(ii) is now proved similarly, as the †-operation is still Π12. 
We can do the same for other inner model operators whose iterability
is Π12.
We do not know whether there is a canonical model of ZF in which
the axiom of choice fails. This would in particular follow if there was a
canonical model of ZF+AD. Whether or not such a model exists is still
open (see the third question below). However, we have the following
partial result:
Theorem 14. Assume that A♯ exists for every A ⊆ R. Then there is
no canonical model of T:=ZF+V=L(R)+AD.
Proof. Suppose that M is a canonical (proper class) inner model and
that T holds in M ; let φ be the canonical sentence for M .
We first claim that RM is countable. Otherwise, we can find a count-
able elementary substructure R# of (RM)#, but then L(R) is an inner
model M ′ has the the same theory as M ; in particular, M |= φ. How-
ever, we will clearly have M ′ 6= M , contradicting the uniqueness of
M .
It now follows from Theorem 0.1 in [ScSt] that we can pass to a
generic extension ofM and find an extender sequence ~E with extenders
below ωM1 such that the symmetric collapse of Col(ω,<ω
M
1 ) over M is
equal to L(R)V (in fact, that paper shows that ωM1 is a limit of Woodin
cardinals in L[ ~E]).
Since RM is countable and since (RM)# exists, the required generic
extension exists in V , as it can be chosen as a collapse below the least
R
M -indiscernible. Thus we can choose L[ ~E] in V and since ωM1 is count-
able and ~E# exists, P (ωM1 )
M is countable in V . Hence we can choose
two different Col(ω,<ωM1 )-generics over M in V . By homogeneity of
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the forcing, the extensions have the same theory, but this contradicts
the uniqueness of M . 
3.1. Strong canonicity.
Definition 15. If Φ is a recursive set of ∈-sentences, then Φ is a
uniqueness set iff there is only one transitive class model M of ZFC
with M |= Φ. In this case, the model M is called weakly canonical. φ
is called weakly canonically iff φ holds in a least one weakly canonical
model. If it holds in all such models, φ is called strongly canonically
necessary.
Strong canonicity may approximate the idea of a ‘true’ axiomatic
system that fixes a unique model of set theory (up to the inevitable
shortcomings of first-order logic that require the restriction to transitive
class models) better, as recursive axiom systems are quite common.
The Cohen example above of a nonprovable, but canonically neces-
sary statement may not work for strong canonicity, as there may not
be a single condition forcing all elements of Φ at once. However, we
still get an example when we use a different forcing:
Theorem 16. There is a strongly canonically necessary statement φ
that does not hold in all transitive class models of ZFC.
Proof. This time, we take ‘I am not a P-extension of L’, where P is
a countably closed and non-trivial notion of forcing (such as the Levy
collapse). Now, if this would hold in a weakly canonical model M
with uniqueness set Φ, then each element of Φ would be forced by
some condition; the set of these conditions would belong to the ground
model as Φ is recursive; and hence, by countable closure, there would
be a common strengthening p to all of them, which forces all elements
of Φ. But now again, we can take a mututally generic filter and obtain
a contradiction as above. 
3.2. Canonical Choices for the Continuum Function. A tempt-
ing question is to determine the status of the continuum hypothesis
under our notions of canonicity. Clearly, CH is canonically possible,
as it holds in L. We conjecture that it is not canonically necessary,
and we plan to prove this in subsequent work. The idea is to iterate
Friedman’s forcing for adding a Π12-singleton in chapter 6 of [Fr] ω2
many times to generate a canonical model in which CH fails.
Here, we restrict ourselves to a simple-minded observation which
suffices to exclude many values for the size of the continuum.
Definition 17. We define the continuum function c : On → On as
that function that takes an ordinal α to 2|α|.
Lemma 18. (i) Every canonically possible value of 2ℵ0 is definable.
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(ii) Every canonically possible continuum function κ 7→ 2κ is defin-
able without parameters. (I.e. if M is a canonical model, then cM is
definable in V .)
Proof. (ii) implies (i).
(ii) Let M be a canonical model, and let φ be a formula such that,
for some parameter x, M = {y : φ(x, y)}. Moreover, let ψ be a formula
such that M is the unique transitive class model of ZFC+ψ. Then
cM is definable in V as: cM(α) = β if and only if ∃x[{y : φ(x, y)} |=
ZFC+ ψ ∧ {y : φ(x, y)} is transitive ∧ {y : φ(x, y)} |= 2|α| = β. 
3.3. Weak Canonicity. We briefly touch the question mentioned above
whether CH is canonically necessary.
Here, we pursue this question by considering a weakened version
of canonical necessity: In our definition above, we required that ZFC
must be capable of proving the existence and uniqueness of a model
of ZFC+φ. A somewhat reasonable weaker requirement would be that
ZFC+φ proves this.
Definition 19. φ is weakly canonical if and only if ZFC+φ proves the
uniqueness and existence statements in the definition of canonicity. If
M is a model of ZFC+φ for some weakly canonical φ, thenM is weakly
canonical. If ψ holds in all weakly canonical models, then ψ is weakly
canonically necessary (weakly c.n.).
Theorem 20. ¬CH is weakly c.p.
Proof. In Theorem 19 of [G], a set forcing extension M of L is con-
structed such that M |= ¬CH, but CH holds in every transitive class
N such that L ⊆ N ⊆M (and this is provable in ZFC). The forcing P
used is definable over M without parameters.
Consider the ∈-statement φ ‘I am a P-extension of L’. Then every
proper inner model of a transitive class modelM of ZFC+φ will satisfy
CH, so that M is the only inner model of M in which CH fails (and all
of this is provable in ZFC+φ). Hence M is a weakly canonical model
of ZFC+¬CH.

4. Theory Canonicity
The fact that canonicity rules out measurable cardinals almost triv-
ially may suggest that it is too strong a demand; and indeed, uniquely
fixing a transitive class model is rather much to ask. A reasonable
weakening would be that the statement φ only fixes transitive class
models up to elementary equivalence.
Definition 21. A sentence φ is ‘theory-canonical’ (tc) if and only if it
is provable in ZFC that any two inner models M and N of ZFC+φ are
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A transitive class modelM of ZFC is tc if and only if some tc sentence
φ holds in M .
A sentence ψ is ‘theory-canonically necessary‘ (tcn) if and only if
ψ holds in every tc class model M of ZFC. Likewise, ψ is ‘theory-
canonically possible’ (tcp) if and only if it holds in some tc class model
M of ZFC.
We observe that theory-canonicity still goes beyond ZFC, but allows
for measurable cardinals:
Proposition 22. The existence of measurable cardinals is theory-
canonically possible.
Proof. Let φ be the statement ‘V = L[U ], where U is a normal ultra-
filter’. Now, every two transitive class models M and M ′ of φ can be
coiterated to a common target model N , which will be elementarily
equivalent to bothM andM ′; thus M andM ′ are elementarily equiva-
lent. Hence φ is tc. Clearly, any transitive class modelM of φ contains
a measurable cardinal. 
Proposition 23. There is an ∈-sentence ψ that is tcn, but does not
follow from ZFC.
Proof. For x ⊆ ω, let Tx be the theory {2
ℵi = ℵi+1 : i ∈ x} ∪ {2
ℵi =
ℵi+2 : i /∈ x}. Thus, in a model of Tx, x is encoded in the continuum
function. Denote the Easton forcing that forces Tx to be true over a
model of GCH by Px.
Now let φ be the sentence that claims that V is not of the form
(L[x])[Px], where x is Cohen-generic over L. Clearly, φ does not follow
from ZFC, as it e.g. fails in models of the form (L[x])[Px] just described.
We claim that φ is tcn. Suppose otherwise; then there are a tc state-
ment ψ and a transitive class modelM of ZFC+ψ+¬φ. Then there is a
real number x which is Cohen-generic over L such thatM = (L[x])[Px].
By the forcing theorem, ψ is forced by some Easton-condition q in Px.
The fact that q belongs to Px and that ψ is forced by q in Px, which
holds in L[x], is in turn forced by some Cohen-condition p over L.
Now let r and r′ be two incompatible extensions of p, and let xr and
xr′ be Cohen-generic reals extending r and r
′, respectively.
Then both in L[xr] and in L[xr′ ], we have that q  ψ. Pick a Pxr-
generic filter Gr and a Pxr′ -generic filter Gr′, both containing q; this is
possible as q belong both to Pxr and to Pxr′ , because r and r
′ extend
p, which forces this.
Then ψ holds both in Mr := (L[xr])[Gr] and in Mr′ := (L[xr′ ])[Gr′ ];
however, as xr 6= xr′ , there is some i ∈ ω such that Mr |= 2
ℵi = ℵi+1
and Mr′ |= 2
ℵi = ℵi+2 or vice versa. Thus Mr and Mr′ are two models
of ZFC+ψ that are not elementarily equivalent, which contradicts the
assumption that ψ is tc. 
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Concerning the size of the continuum however, theory canonicity has
little information to offer:
Proposition 24. When ι is definable in L and cf(ι) > ω, then there
is a tc model of ZFC+2ℵ0 = ℵι. That is, any possible value of the
continuum that is definable is also theory-canonically possible.
Proof. Let Pι be the Cohen forcing notion for achieving 2
ℵ0 = ℵι over
L. Then Pι is definable from ι, which is definable by assumption, so Pι
is definable in L. Now the statement φ ≡‘V is a Pι-generic extension
of L’ in a transitive class model M of ZFC implies that M |= 2ℵ0 = ℵι
and moreover, by homogenity of Pι, all sentences true in M are forced
by 1 and thus hold in all such extensions. Thus M is a tc model in
which 2ℵ0 = 2ℵι holds. 
5. Further Ideas and Questions
Question 25. Is V = HOD (theory-)canonically necessary?
Question 26. We saw above that, under appropriate large cardinal
assumptions, there is no canonical model of ZF+V = L(R)+AD. Is
there a canonical model of ZF+AD?
Question 27. (Dominik Klein): Is AC canonical for models of ZF?
That is, is there a formula φ such that there is a unique transitive class
model M of ZF+φ and such that AC fails in M? (Note that this a
positive answer to the last question would imply a negative answer to
this one.)
Question 28. Can M#1 be an element of a canonical model?
Question 29. In general, are some ZFC axioms (theory-)canonical
over the others? Or over KP? Are there e.g. canonical models for
ZFC− in which power set fails? Or of ZFC without replacement in
which replacement is false?
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